It looks obvious

Yesterday I started to discuss how the misconception of "Victory" in the war might lead us to another round, and I would like to develop some of the ideas further.

It is commonly agreed that the Egyptian goal in 1973 was to bring Israel back into the negotiation table, with realization that its military might is breakable. It was a great example how to use military power, although inferior, to achieve diplomatic successes. If the lesson that Hezbullah and Syria would have applied to this war to would achieve great victory. However like most victorious, and Israel can provide many examples of its own, they are failing to analyze the real factors and their limitations.

Hezbullah had several advantages during this war most of them in the expectations levels. In the operational level Israel failed to take advantage that the Hezbullah didn’t behave like a guerilla force, but as an organize army. In addition the Israeli army applied, at least in the first few weeks,  the same tactics it used in Gaza strip which lead to tactical achievement in causing higher level of casualties then expected to the Israeli units.

The most important was the fact that the Hezbullah was cable of firing rockets until the last moment, and is still capable of doing this today. The advantage of achieving victory by not loosing was the greatest advantage the Hezbullah had, and Nasrallah use this advantage brilliantly.

Analysis of the results in light of these factors pointing to the very limit nature of the victory. Assuming that you can force Israel from the Golan Heights using the same operational and strategic assumption, as it seems from Asad’s speech, is a dangerous mistake. Moreover, Syria with its army has even less advantages than the Hezbullah as organization had, only because it is a state and has more to loose. Using the Hezbullah to exhaust Israel and to achieve limited results is one thing, to fight Israel directly is completely different.

Hezbullah victory, or the Israeli failure to win, can be a great opportunity for the Hezbullah in the internal Lebanese political system. It can, additionally, help Syria to regain influence in Lebanon (which I don’t think as necessarily bad think). Moreover, with competent leadership Syria can break its international isolation. Such achievement could be a great trigger to renewal of the peace negotiation with Israel.

Sadly it seems that Syria choose to loose what it achieved and risk it with greater distraction.