It looks obvious

One has to wonder what was Iran goal in abducting fifteen British sailors, in Iraq’s territorial water, and how should it be handled. However trying to answer these questions, with the little knowledge we have is no more than a , not very smart, gamble.

While I will not try to answer those question I would highlight some points that I don’t hear in the public discussion. Which seems to repeat several slogans, or someone’s talking point, without even attempting to say something original.

I am still convince that our policy toward Iran is wrong. Since the revolution we are failing to realize that Iran’s diplomacy, it aspirations, short and long term interests and challenges didn’t start at the late 70’s of the 20th century. Lack of understanding that although Iran is controlled by leaders with religious ideology it is mostly ruled by Iranian leaders and those has Iran’s interests high in their priority list.

We failed to understand that Iran’s worries from its Arab neighbors , Pakistan -  with its nuclear arsenal - and Russia, with its long history expansion toward Iran’s border, didn’t change after the revolution. Instead we emphasized how dangerous Iran is, and how we should prepare to long confrontation. It was only worse by the fact that this policy confirmed Iran’s own’s, wrong,  predictions and prevented from building more realistic diplomatic policy.

Assuming that Iran’s leadership is, as it always was, mostly logical we should try to figure out how the abduction integrated in Iran’s long term goals. Is it intend to local consumption - to calm the growing unrest and discomfort after the impose sanctions? Or is it part of Iran’s effort to ensure American failure in Iraq? We should try to figure out why Iran’s thought that this move will help its effort to develop nuclear capabilities. And another question we should figure out - why does Iran believe we cannot retaliate, or at least incapable to retaliate effectively?

We should also ask ourselves what should we try to achieve from this crisis. It is very typical that the approach represent all over the media is how we are going to win this conflict, but maybe we shouldn’t? maybe it will serve our long term interests if we will allow Iran to achieve tactical victory? Or on the other hand why should our range of responses should be limited to war or negotiations only? Why can’t we use a mix of diplomacy with limited demonstration of power. Sinking Iranian ship can be a fairly good demonstration of power and willingness to use it, and it can be used, as the Iranian demonstrate, as part of the diplomatic process.

But all of these are, obviously, only speculations of one whose knowledge is based on reading the newspapers. And since I had the gall to start guessing I will continue with my personal, unsupported, theory about Iran’s goal initiating this conflict. It seems that the negotiations about Iran’s nuclear aspirations got into stalemate, and worse the international sanctions having a growing internal negative effect. Iran needed a move to re-open the diplomatic negotiations, and it needed to be able to appear as having some advantages. This is somewhat similar move to the Egyptian strategy in 1973. While I think that having Iran wins some points isn’t essentially wrong, I think that Iran’s policy of using violence as part of its diplomatic efforts should be discourage. And while I don’t think it is our interest to set ultimatums It wouldn’t be necessarily wrong to retaliate with limited attack on some Iranian naval targets.

And if all of these doesn’t work, we can always follow Oliver’s policy…

Tags: Strategy Iran Crisis Nuclear Weapons England Hostages