It looks obvious

I read Pat Buchanan’s historical analysis about the Munich agreement and the main decisions and events that lead to World War II. This is very interesting review and I will surely read Buchanan’s new book with great interest.

While I agree with the argument that we are judging Chamberlain unjustly and using the term Appeasement rather loosely. Buchanan explains Chamberlain reasoning and justifications to sign the Munich agreement, and preventing a war is only a partial explanation. It wasn’t the appeasement that lead to war, argue Buchanan, rather than the guarantees to protect Poland over the dispute over Danzig.

However, as it is wrong to blame the entire war on the Munich Agreement and on Chamberlain’s policies it is wrong to dismiss them all together. In addition it is wrong to assume that would the British not backed Poland over the Danzig question the war could have been avoided. The assumption in both cases is that Hitler was sane, and that he was not determine to go to war. I’m not sure that the second assessment is right, I’m pretty sure that the first is wrong.

While the world leaders didn’t have the benefit of retrospect, we do! and examining Hitler’s strategy during the entire war demonstrate a problematic connection between goals and actions. It is equally wrong to assume that the Munich Agreement appeasement was the cause of the war as it is wrong to assume that giving up in Danzig and forcing Poland into more reasonable policies would have prevented it.

I followed a recommendation and discovered this wonderful short story by Winston Churchill from 1930. Churchill demonstrates, in this story, his mastery in using words to express ideas and his sharp analytical abilities in this interesting attempt to play with alternative history:

THE quaint conceit of imagining what would have happened if some important or unimportant event had settled itself differently has become so fashionable that I am encouraged to enter upon an absurd speculation. What would have happened if Lee had not won the battle of Gettysburg? Once a great victory is won it dominates not only the future but the past. All the chains of consequence clink out as if they never could stop. The hopes that were shattered, the passions that were quelled, the sacrifices that were ineffectual are all swept out of the land of reality.

Sixty seven years ago, on September 1^st, 1939, German forces invaded Poland and started what later become World War Two. And now 67 years after that horrible war, with all the experience that we presumably gained, can we say that the world is safer?

Can we look into the eyes of a child in Darfur and explain to him why are we waiting for the Sudan’s government to approve sending international force to stop the genocide and maybe save his life? Can we look at the eyes of Leanness child and promised him that the UN will send troops that will ensure that Terror organizations will not risk her life any more?  

Can we say that we learn how to deal with world leaders like Hitler and we will not appease them and that the Munich agreement was a mistake that will not happened again? Can we say that we are even trying to make the world safer place?

Recently I started to read a new book about the “Yom-Kipur” war, or the October 73 war in its other name.  The book, "The Yom Kipur War – Moment of Truth ", is not translated to English yet, but I suspect it is not long until it will. Since this war is a long interest of mine, and since the book claimed to bring new evidence not yet published I rushed to buy it.

I know it is wrong to criticize a book by its first chapter, and I’ll try avoiding that. However since the book deal with many aspects of the war, although limiting itself to the southern front, I will allow myself to summarize and state my opinion on the subjects as I’m reading them.

Not surprisingly, the book first chapters discussing the misconception in the Israeli army and government, and the misunderstanding of the Egyptians and Syrian military preparations. The book is rich with description and details about the chronological events. What the book is lacking is an explanation, a theory that will make sense of all the details.

It is easy to claim that the Israeli leadership was captive of its own misconception, and therefore they did not realize from the flood of data that a war is going to erupt. But what was this conception, and why was it so strong that the brilliant people leading the military intelligence and the country leadership just dismissed the obvious data.

It is easy to dismiss the Israeli approach as simple arrogance. The historical documents present allot of evidence how this arrogance affected the military leadership to believe that they are invincible.  But it this explanation solve the mystery?  I don’t think so.

The book, as many other books before it, failed to discuss what the conception that failed was. What ware the criterions they serve to evaluate the flood of information. The information in the book, including the newly reveled pieces, generates a story with no lesson to be learned.

The conception which was a consensus among the Israeli leadership was that the Egyptians will not start a war without bomber that can attack in the center of Israel and that the Syrian will not go to war alone. The reason that the Israeli kept looking for the Egyptian bomber was the understanding that the Egyptian think that they cannot achieve decisive victory without controlling the sky.

Technically this conception was correct. The Syrian didn’t go, and wouldn’t go, to war alone and the Egyptian didn’t believe that they can achieve decisive victory without improving their air-force abilities. However, and this is the biggest failure of the Israeli conception, the Egyptian, and mostly the Egyptian president – Sa’adat, didn’t try to achieve decisive victory.

Sa’adat’s analysis of the situation was much more advanced than is Israeli counterparts. His realization that the Israeli are unwilling for negotiations that will lead to Israeli withdrawal from the Sinay peninsula has to be shaken. Sa’adat was willing to use war as a diplomatic tool, to serve his strategic goals.

This simple concept, that a war can be used to achieve limited strategic goals, was what the Israelis failed to see. While the Israelis looked for the sign to a war that will aim to destroy Israel the Egyptians changed the rules of the game. Moreover, and this point maybe deserve a different discussion, the Israeli failed to recognize the exact same issue  just few years ago, and this is the main reason that they lost the War of Attrition.

With the advantage of hindsight look at the events we can summarize that although the Israeli army was able to achieve several tactical victories during the war it failed to serve the strategic goal of keeping the status-quo in Sinay. The Egyptian war goal to push the Israelis toward negotiations that will lead to Israeli withdrawal from Sinay was achieved completely.

The next chapters in the book discussing the military activity in the few hours before the war and its beginning phase. They are leading toward my next question which is a “what if” question: would the Israeli knew in advance about the Egyptian and Syrian plan, could they prevent them?